ci(fix-security-vulnerability): Use opus 4.6#19416
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| model: claude-opus-4-6 | ||
| claude_args: | | ||
| --max-turns 20 --allowedTools "Bash(gh api repos/getsentry/sentry-javascript/dependabot/alerts/*),Bash(gh pr create *),Bash(gh issue create *),Bash(yarn why *),Bash(yarn install*),Bash(yarn dedupe-deps:*),Bash(npm view *),Bash(git checkout *),Bash(git add *),Bash(git commit *),Edit,Write" | ||
| --max-turns 20 --allowedTools "Bash(gh api *repos/getsentry/sentry-javascript/dependabot/alerts/*),Bash(gh pr create *),Bash(gh issue create *),Bash(yarn why *),Bash(yarn install*),Bash(yarn dedupe-deps:*),Bash(npm view *),Bash(git checkout *),Bash(git add *),Bash(git commit *),Edit,Write" |
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Bug: The allowedTools pattern for gh api includes an unintentional leading wildcard *, making it overly permissive and conflicting with explicit prompt instructions.
Severity: MEDIUM
Suggested Fix
Remove the leading wildcard * from the allowedTools pattern. The pattern should be Bash(gh api repos/getsentry/sentry-javascript/dependabot/alerts/*) to strictly enforce the intended command structure and prevent the use of forbidden flags.
Prompt for AI Agent
Review the code at the location below. A potential bug has been identified by an AI
agent.
Verify if this is a real issue. If it is, propose a fix; if not, explain why it's not
valid.
Location: .github/workflows/fix-security-vulnerability.yml#L56
Potential issue: In the `fix-security-vulnerability.yml` workflow, the `allowedTools`
pattern for `gh api` was changed to `Bash(gh api
*repos/getsentry/sentry-javascript/dependabot/alerts/*)`. The leading wildcard `*`
before `repos/` is likely unintentional and creates an overly permissive security rule.
This change allows the AI assistant to potentially bypass explicit instructions in the
prompt that forbid using flags like `--paginate`. While the prompt instructs the model
to use an exact command format, this technical loophole weakens the security boundary
intended to restrict the AI's actions.
Did we get this right? 👍 / 👎 to inform future reviews.
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Cursor Bugbot has reviewed your changes and found 1 potential issue.
Bugbot Autofix is OFF. To automatically fix reported issues with Cloud Agents, enable Autofix in the Cursor dashboard.
| model: claude-opus-4-6 | ||
| claude_args: | | ||
| --max-turns 20 --allowedTools "Bash(gh api repos/getsentry/sentry-javascript/dependabot/alerts/*),Bash(gh pr create *),Bash(gh issue create *),Bash(yarn why *),Bash(yarn install*),Bash(yarn dedupe-deps:*),Bash(npm view *),Bash(git checkout *),Bash(git add *),Bash(git commit *),Edit,Write" | ||
| --max-turns 20 --allowedTools "Bash(gh api *repos/getsentry/sentry-javascript/dependabot/alerts/*),Bash(gh pr create *),Bash(gh issue create *),Bash(yarn why *),Bash(yarn install*),Bash(yarn dedupe-deps:*),Bash(npm view *),Bash(git checkout *),Bash(git add *),Bash(git commit *),Edit,Write" |
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Overly permissive wildcard weakens security tool restriction
Medium Severity
The leading * wildcard in Bash(gh api *repos/getsentry/sentry-javascript/dependabot/alerts/*) allows arbitrary text before repos/, including CLI flags like --method PATCH. The SKILL.md teaches the agent to dismiss alerts via gh api --method PATCH repos/.../dependabot/alerts/<number>, which the original pattern blocked but the new pattern permits. This undermines the defense-in-depth for the prompt's "Do NOT dismiss any alerts" instruction. A narrower fix (e.g., adding a second pattern for /repos/...) would preserve least-privilege.
Triggered by project rule: PR Review Guidelines for Cursor Bot
Codecov Results 📊Generated by Codecov Action |
Codecov Results 📊✅ 22 passed | ⏭️ 8 skipped | Total: 30 | Pass Rate: 73.33% | Execution Time: 12.22s All tests are passing successfully. Generated by Codecov Action |
Codecov Results 📊✅ 23 passed | ⏭️ 7 skipped | Total: 30 | Pass Rate: 76.67% | Execution Time: 11.48s All tests are passing successfully. Generated by Codecov Action |
size-limit report 📦
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node-overhead report 🧳Note: This is a synthetic benchmark with a minimal express app and does not necessarily reflect the real-world performance impact in an application.
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2 participants
Maybe we need a smarter clanker
Closes #19417 (added automatically)