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crosswalks: refresh cfgaudit to v1.11.0 (53 rules onto 23 classes) #123

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crosswalks: refresh cfgaudit to v1.11.0 (53 rules onto 23 classes) #123

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192 changes: 117 additions & 75 deletions crosswalks/cfgaudit-to-ave.json
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -3,26 +3,26 @@
"source": {
"tool": "cfgaudit",
"vendor": "cfgaudit",
"version": "1.10.0",
"version": "1.11.0",
"url": "https://github.com/cfgaudit/cfgaudit",
"license": "Apache-2.0",
"tool_class": "static configuration auditor",
"rules_total": 92,
"rules_mapped": 35
"rules_total": 97,
"rules_mapped": 53
},
"target": {
"standard": "AVE",
"version": "1.1.0",
"url": "https://aveproject.org",
"record_count": 59,
"static_record_count": 44
"record_count": 70,
"static_record_count": 51
},
"generated": "2026-07-25",
"note": "cfgaudit is a static auditor of committable AI-agent CONFIGURATION files. It does not connect to running servers or observe runtime, so it maps only to AVE's static_detection records. Each cfgaudit rule emits its primary AVE id in JSON/SARIF output (see github.com/cfgaudit/cfgaudit/blob/main/docs/cfgaudit-to-ave.md). Mappings are class-level behavioral equivalence, not asserted identity. cfgaudit maps 35 config-surface rules onto 19 AVE behavioral classes (many-to-one: several rules per class, since cfgaudit slices threats by config surface where AVE slices by behavior). AVE-2026-00036 (lateral movement) was implemented and then reverted after a false-positive analysis; see gaps.",
"generated": "2026-08-05",
"note": "cfgaudit is a static auditor of committable AI-agent CONFIGURATION files. It does not connect to running servers or observe runtime, so it maps only to AVE's static_detection records. Each cfgaudit rule emits its primary AVE id in JSON/SARIF output (see github.com/cfgaudit/cfgaudit/blob/main/docs/cfgaudit-to-ave.md). Mappings are class-level behavioral equivalence, not asserted identity. cfgaudit now maps 53 config-surface rules onto 23 AVE behavioral classes, up from 35 onto 19 at v1.10.0. Most of that growth is not new cfgaudit rules: it is previously unmapped rules finding a home in AVE-2026-00061 through AVE-2026-00064, the four config classes AVE added from this crosswalk's own gap list (aveproject/ave#68). CFG091 moved from AVE-2026-00021 to AVE-2026-00063: 00021 describes a component that explicitly INSTRUCTS the agent to bypass confirmation, while qwen's tools.approvalMode is a setting, which is what 00063 covers 'independent of any instruction text'.",
"mappings": [
{
"ave_id": "AVE-2026-00003",
"title": "credential exfiltration",
"title": "Credential exfiltration via agent instruction",
"cfgaudit_rules": [
"CFG031",
"CFG036",
Expand All @@ -32,123 +32,123 @@
},
{
"ave_id": "AVE-2026-00004",
"title": "shell-pipe code execution",
"title": "Arbitrary code execution via shell pipe injection in agentic component",
"cfgaudit_rules": [
"CFG008",
"CFG014"
]
},
{
"ave_id": "AVE-2026-00005",
"title": "recursive filesystem destruction",
"title": "Recursive file system destruction via destructive command injection in agentic component",
"cfgaudit_rules": [
"CFG039"
]
},
{
"ave_id": "AVE-2026-00007",
"title": "prompt-injection goal hijack",
"title": "Agent goal hijack via direct instruction override in agentic component",
"cfgaudit_rules": [
"CFG026",
"CFG092"
]
},
{
"ave_id": "AVE-2026-00008",
"title": "persistence / self-replication",
"title": "Agent persistence via self-replication instruction in agentic component",
"cfgaudit_rules": [
"CFG027",
"CFG028"
]
},
{
"ave_id": "AVE-2026-00010",
"title": "covert instruction concealment",
"title": "Covert instruction concealment via secrecy directive in agentic component",
"cfgaudit_rules": [
"CFG030"
]
},
{
"ave_id": "AVE-2026-00011",
"title": "dynamic tool-call injection",
"title": "Arbitrary tool invocation via dynamic tool call injection in agentic component",
"cfgaudit_rules": [
"CFG035"
]
},
{
"ave_id": "AVE-2026-00017",
"title": "server impersonation / spoofing",
"title": "MCP Server Impersonation or Spoofing",
"cfgaudit_rules": [
"CFG052",
"CFG059"
]
},
{
"ave_id": "AVE-2026-00021",
"title": "autonomous action without confirmation",
"title": "Autonomous Action Without User Confirmation",
"cfgaudit_rules": [
"CFG029",
"CFG091"
"CFG029"
]
},
{
"ave_id": "AVE-2026-00025",
"title": "conversation-history / role injection",
"title": "Conversation History Injection",
"cfgaudit_rules": [
"CFG032"
]
},
{
"ave_id": "AVE-2026-00027",
"title": "multi-turn instruction persistence",
"title": "Multi-Turn Attack - Instruction Persistence Across Conversations",
"cfgaudit_rules": [
"CFG081"
]
},
{
"ave_id": "AVE-2026-00029",
"title": "homoglyph / Unicode obfuscation",
"title": "Homoglyph or Unicode Obfuscation Attack",
"cfgaudit_rules": [
"CFG024"
]
},
{
"ave_id": "AVE-2026-00032",
"title": "network reconnaissance instruction",
"title": "Network Reconnaissance Instruction",
"cfgaudit_rules": [
"CFG090"
]
},
{
"ave_id": "AVE-2026-00039",
"title": "covert-channel exfiltration",
"title": "Covert Channel - Steganographic Data Exfiltration",
"cfgaudit_rules": [
"CFG033",
"CFG072"
]
},
{
"ave_id": "AVE-2026-00047",
"title": "hardcoded credentials in component",
"title": "Hardcoded credentials in agent component - API keys and secrets exposed in skill files",
"cfgaudit_rules": [
"CFG007",
"CFG050",
"CFG054",
"CFG065",
"CFG073"
"CFG073",
"CFG097"
]
},
{
"ave_id": "AVE-2026-00048",
"title": "unsafe agent delegation chain",
"title": "Unsafe agent delegation chain - sub-agent spawned with inherited permissions and no trust boundary",
"cfgaudit_rules": [
"CFG051",
"CFG085"
]
},
{
"ave_id": "AVE-2026-00055",
"title": "command exec via untrusted MCP launch config",
"title": "Command execution via untrusted MCP server launch configuration (STDIO)",
"cfgaudit_rules": [
"CFG019",
"CFG020",
Expand All @@ -157,17 +157,59 @@
},
{
"ave_id": "AVE-2026-00057",
"title": "obfuscated/encoded payload",
"title": "Obfuscated or encoded skill payload designed to evade static scanners",
"cfgaudit_rules": [
"CFG057"
]
},
{
"ave_id": "AVE-2026-00058",
"title": "deceptive trigger / activation-scope",
"title": "Deceptive skill trigger or activation-scope manipulation via misleading manifest description",
"cfgaudit_rules": [
"CFG056"
]
},
{
"ave_id": "AVE-2026-00061",
"title": "TLS certificate verification disabled in agent component configuration",
"cfgaudit_rules": [
"CFG075"
]
},
{
"ave_id": "AVE-2026-00062",
"title": "Unpinned dependency version allowing supply chain substitution",
"cfgaudit_rules": [
"CFG010",
"CFG055",
"CFG074",
"CFG089"
]
},
{
"ave_id": "AVE-2026-00063",
"title": "Human approval gate bypassed via declarative configuration, distinct from AVE-2026-00048",
"cfgaudit_rules": [
"CFG003",
"CFG004",
"CFG048",
"CFG053",
"CFG063",
"CFG079",
"CFG087",
"CFG091",
"CFG093",
"CFG096"
]
},
{
"ave_id": "AVE-2026-00064",
"title": "Zero-click code execution via project-load auto-run configuration",
"cfgaudit_rules": [
"CFG047",
"CFG067",
"CFG086"
]
}
],
"gaps": [
Expand All @@ -177,19 +219,31 @@
},
{
"ave_id": "AVE-2026-00036",
"note": "lateral movement. cfgaudit implemented and then reverted this rule. The vocabulary ('lateral movement', 'pivot to other systems') is intent-ambiguous, appearing in security-tool self-description and defensive contexts a static linter cannot distinguish from a directive. The reverted rule used the CFG091 id, which cfgaudit has since reused for the qwen approval-mode rule (mapped to AVE-2026-00021)."
"note": "lateral movement. cfgaudit implemented and then reverted this rule. The vocabulary ('lateral movement', 'pivot') appears in ordinary security tooling and infrastructure docs, so the false-positive rate was unacceptable for a static config check."
},
{
"ave_id": "AVE-2026-00059",
"note": "fragmented cross-description injection. Needs multi-source correlation; cfgaudit checks each file in isolation."
"note": "fragmented cross-description injection. Needs multi-source correlation; cfgaudit checks each file independently."
},
{
"ave_id": "AVE-2026-00065",
"note": "A2A agent card poisoning. cfgaudit reaches the committed pointer but not the card. A .gemini/agents/*.md may carry an inline agent_card_json, which cfgaudit recognises well enough to classify the file as a remote agent, but it does not audit the card's contents. It does flag a cleartext agent_card_url and a credential literal in the same file's auth block (CFG097)."
},
{
"ave_id": "AVE-2026-00060",
"note": "STDIO transport shell injection. Server-side implementation flaw, requires SAST of the MCP server source rather than reading its launch configuration. Same layer as AVE-2026-00052 and AVE-2026-00053; see the static_detection note below."
},
{
"ave_id": "AVE-2026-00069",
"note": "image-hidden instructions in a skill package. Requires binary content analysis of a bundled image; cfgaudit reads text configuration only. Same layer as AVE-2026-00024."
}
],
"coverage": {
"ave_static_records": 44,
"cfgaudit_rules_total": 92,
"cfgaudit_rules_mapped": 35,
"ave_classes_covered": 19,
"cfgaudit_rules_unmapped": 57
"ave_static_records": 51,
"cfgaudit_rules_total": 97,
"cfgaudit_rules_mapped": 53,
"ave_classes_covered": 23,
"cfgaudit_rules_unmapped": 44
},
"validation": {
"against": {
Expand All @@ -199,57 +253,37 @@
"method": "same SKILL.md per rule, cfgaudit canonical triggers unmodified, static engines only (pattern+yara+semgrep, no LLM), both reading ave_id from JSON",
"shared_surface_rules": 10,
"agreements": 5,
"note": "5 of the 10 instruction-content rules that share a scan surface with Bawbel: both scanners independently emit the same ave_id. The 5 divergences are detection-pattern differences, not mapping errors."
"note": "5 of the 10 instruction-content rules that share a scan surface with Bawbel: both scanners independently emit the same ave_id. The 5 divergences are detection-pattern differences, not mapping errors. Re-checked at cfgaudit v1.11.0 against AVE record set 1.1.0 (70 records). A false-positive pass over 432 real repositories preceded this release and changed two rules, neither of them mapped: CFG015 and CFG009 stopped firing on hook idioms, and a Cursor build-cache warning was withdrawn."
},
"config_surfaces_beyond_ave": [
{
"surface": "permission / approval config",
"example_rules": [
"CFG001",
"CFG003",
"CFG004",
"CFG048",
"CFG079"
]
},
{
"surface": "zero-click IDE / workspace auto-run",
"example_rules": [
"CFG047",
"CFG067",
"CFG086",
"CFG087"
]
},
{
"surface": "telemetry / endpoint redirect",
"example_rules": [
"CFG005",
"CFG046",
"CFG071"
]
],
"note": "Still open. Distinct from AVE-2026-00002: nothing is injected into the model's context. A committed key/value changes where the process sends data, and the model never sees it, so detection is a value comparison rather than content analysis. OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_*ENDPOINT to a non-local collector, ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL off Anthropic (CVE-2026-21852), a model or provider base URL over cleartext http."
},
{
"surface": "sandbox weakening in config",
"example_rules": [
"CFG022",
"CFG061",
"CFG064"
]
},
{
"surface": "TLS verification disabled",
"example_rules": [
"CFG075"
]
"CFG064",
"CFG079",
"CFG095"
],
"note": "Still open. sandbox.excludedCommands with a wildcard or shell, bwrapPath/socatPath helper substitution, network.allowUnixSockets naming docker.sock, filesystem.allowWrite on $PATH or a shell rc; Gemini tools.sandboxAllowedPaths exposing / or ~; Codex sandbox_mode danger-full-access and [sandbox_workspace_write] network_access; Cursor .cursor/sandbox.json type insecure_none and an inverted networkPolicy."
},
{
"surface": "container / daemon posture",
"example_rules": [
"CFG082",
"CFG083",
"CFG084"
]
"CFG084",
"CFG083"
],
"note": "Still open, and it is THREE mechanisms with no shared detection logic, not one class. (1) daemon redirected off-host: DOCKER_HOST or a -H/--host flag pointing at a remote tcp:// or ssh:// daemon. (2) image trust verification disabled: DOCKER_CONTENT_TRUST=0, --disable-content-trust, --insecure-registry. (3) browser subprocess replaced: an MCP server's args carrying --utility-cmd-prefix, --renderer-cmd-prefix, --gpu-launcher or --browser-subprocess-path. The first is the highest-value single record."
},
{
"surface": "MCP network / transport posture",
Expand All @@ -259,16 +293,24 @@
"CFG058",
"CFG021",
"CFG069"
]
],
"note": "Still open, and likewise a surface rather than a class: FIVE mechanisms. Bind address 0.0.0.0 or [::] (NeighborJack); a wildcard CORS origin in env, escalating when auth is disabled in the same env (CVE-2026-33010); type sse, the deprecated transport; HTTP_PROXY/HTTPS_PROXY/ALL_PROXY resolving off loopback; HTTP transport enabled without log redaction, so request bodies with bearer tokens reach the logs (CVE-2026-42282, CVE-2026-41495). The bind-all case is the highest-value single record."
},
{
"surface": "supply-chain pinning / plugin auto-install",
"surface": "cleartext endpoint, distinct from TLS verification disabled",
"example_rules": [
"CFG010",
"CFG055",
"CFG074",
"CFG089"
]
"CFG049",
"CFG071",
"CFG097"
],
"note": "New in this revision, and it has no class in either direction. AVE-2026-00061 covers verification being switched off; this is the case where there is no TLS at all. A committed http:// MCP server URL, model base URL, or A2A agent_card_url."
},
{
"surface": "natural-language steering of an approval classifier",
"example_rules": [
"CFG094"
],
"note": "New in this revision. Cursor's .cursor/permissions.json autoRun.allow_instructions is prose the repository feeds to the classifier that decides, in Auto-review mode, whether a tool call runs without asking. It falls between AVE-2026-00063, which is explicitly 'independent of any instruction text', and AVE-2026-00021, which is an instruction to the agent rather than to a gatekeeper."
}
]
}
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