From 6b689a0c54077e8f3398b4475b397c4c12a77515 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: J Camposeco <108859819+jcamposeco@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2024 14:05:37 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 1/4] openssl: Fix CVE-2023-50782 affecting python-cryptography
 (#9209)

(cherry picked from commit 92416a75252a02961ac476e9c76b388d191fb6a2)
---
 ...enssl-1.1.1-pkcs1-implicit-rejection.patch | 1141 +++++++++++++++++
 SPECS/openssl/openssl.spec                    |   11 +
 2 files changed, 1152 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 SPECS/openssl/openssl-1.1.1-pkcs1-implicit-rejection.patch

diff --git a/SPECS/openssl/openssl-1.1.1-pkcs1-implicit-rejection.patch b/SPECS/openssl/openssl-1.1.1-pkcs1-implicit-rejection.patch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..f3c2b9b66f4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SPECS/openssl/openssl-1.1.1-pkcs1-implicit-rejection.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,1141 @@
+--- openssl-1.1.1k/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod.pkcs1-implicit-rejection	2023-11-17 17:29:02.881552878 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1k/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod	2023-11-17 17:29:02.923553658 +0100
+@@ -256,6 +256,15 @@ B<label>. The return value is the label
+ must have been set to B<RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING>. The resulting pointer is owned
+ by the library and should not be freed by the caller.
+ 
++Similarly to the B<RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING> above, since OpenSSL version
++3.1.0, the use of B<RSA_PKCS1_PADDING> will return a randomly generated message
++instead of padding errors in case padding checks fail. Applications that
++want to remain secure while using earlier versions of OpenSSL, still need to
++handle both the error code from the RSA decryption operation and the
++returned message in a side channel secure manner.
++This protection against Bleichenbacher attacks can be disabled by setting
++the OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION (an unsigned integer) to 0.
++
+ =head2 DSA parameters
+ 
+ The EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dsa_paramgen_bits() macro sets the number of bits used
+--- openssl-1.1.1k/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_decrypt.pod.pkcs1-implicit-rejection	2021-03-25 14:28:38.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1k/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_decrypt.pod	2023-11-17 17:29:02.923553658 +0100
+@@ -41,6 +41,18 @@ EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init() and EVP_PKEY_dec
+ or a negative value for failure. In particular a return value of -2
+ indicates the operation is not supported by the public key algorithm.
+ 
++=head1 WARNINGS
++
++In OpenSSL versions before 3.1.0, when used in PKCS#1 v1.5 padding,
++both the return value from the EVP_PKEY_decrypt() and the B<outlen> provided
++information useful in mounting a Bleichenbacher attack against the
++used private key. They had to processed in a side-channel free way.
++
++Since version 3.1.0, the EVP_PKEY_decrypt() method when used with PKCS#1
++v1.5 padding doesn't return an error in case it detects an error in padding,
++instead it returns a pseudo-randomly generated message, removing the need
++of side-channel secure code from applications using OpenSSL.
++
+ =head1 EXAMPLES
+ 
+ Decrypt data using OAEP (for RSA keys):
+--- openssl-1.1.1k/doc/man3/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.pod.pkcs1-implicit-rejection	2021-03-25 14:28:38.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1k/doc/man3/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.pod	2023-11-17 17:29:02.923553658 +0100
+@@ -125,8 +125,8 @@ L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
+ 
+ =head1 WARNINGS
+ 
+-The result of RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2() is a very sensitive
+-information which can potentially be used to mount a Bleichenbacher
++The result of RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2() is exactly the
++information which is used to mount a classical Bleichenbacher
+ padding oracle attack. This is an inherent weakness in the PKCS #1
+ v1.5 padding design. Prefer PKCS1_OAEP padding. If that is not
+ possible, the result of RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2() should be
+@@ -141,6 +141,9 @@ as this would create a small timing side
+ used to mount a Bleichenbacher attack against any padding mode
+ including PKCS1_OAEP.
+ 
++You should prefer the use of EVP PKEY APIs for PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption
++as they implement the necessary workarounds internally.
++
+ =head1 SEE ALSO
+ 
+ L<RSA_public_encrypt(3)>,
+--- openssl-1.1.1k/doc/man3/RSA_public_encrypt.pod.pkcs1-implicit-rejection	2021-03-25 14:28:38.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1k/doc/man3/RSA_public_encrypt.pod	2023-11-17 17:29:02.923553658 +0100
+@@ -48,8 +48,8 @@ Encrypting user data directly with RSA i
+ 
+ =back
+ 
+-B<flen> must not be more than RSA_size(B<rsa>) - 11 for the PKCS #1 v1.5
+-based padding modes, not more than RSA_size(B<rsa>) - 42 for
++When encrypting B<flen> must not be more than RSA_size(B<rsa>) - 11 for the
++PKCS #1 v1.5 based padding modes, not more than RSA_size(B<rsa>) - 42 for
+ RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING and exactly RSA_size(B<rsa>) for RSA_NO_PADDING.
+ When a padding mode other than RSA_NO_PADDING is in use, then
+ RSA_public_encrypt() will include some random bytes into the ciphertext
+@@ -88,6 +88,13 @@ which can potentially be used to mount a
+ attack. This is an inherent weakness in the PKCS #1 v1.5 padding
+ design. Prefer RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING.
+ 
++In OpenSSL before version 3.1.0, both the return value and the length of
++returned value could be used to mount the Bleichenbacher attack.
++Since version 3.1.0, OpenSSL does not return an error in case of padding
++checks failed. Instead it generates a random message based on used private
++key and provided ciphertext so that application code doesn't have to implement
++a side-channel secure error handling.
++
+ =head1 CONFORMING TO
+ 
+ SSL, PKCS #1 v2.0
+--- openssl-1.1.1k/doc/man1/pkeyutl.pod.pkcs1-implicit-rejection	2021-03-25 14:28:38.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1k/doc/man1/pkeyutl.pod	2023-11-17 17:29:02.923553658 +0100
+@@ -224,6 +224,11 @@ signed or verified directly instead of u
+ digest is set then the a B<DigestInfo> structure is used and its the length
+ must correspond to the digest type.
+ 
++Note, for B<pkcs1> padding, as a protection against Bleichenbacher attack,
++the decryption will not fail in case of padding check failures. Use B<none>
++and manual inspection of the decrypted message to verify if the decrypted
++value has correct PKCS#1 v1.5 padding.
++
+ For B<oaep> mode only encryption and decryption is supported.
+ 
+ For B<x931> if the digest type is set it is used to format the block data
+@@ -246,6 +251,16 @@ B<PSS> block structure.
+ For PSS and OAEP padding sets the MGF1 digest. If the MGF1 digest is not
+ explicitly set in PSS mode then the signing digest is used.
+ 
++=item B<rsa_pkcs1_implicit_rejection:>I<flag>
++
++Disables (when set to 0) or enables (when set to 1) the use of implicit
++rejection with PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption. When enabled (the default), as a
++protection against Bleichenbacher attack, the library will generate a
++deterministic random plaintext that it will return to the caller in case
++of padding check failure.
++When disabled, it's the callers' responsibility to handle the returned
++errors in a side-channel free manner.
++
+ =back
+ 
+ =head1 RSA-PSS ALGORITHM
+--- openssl-1.1.1k/doc/man1/rsautl.pod.pkcs1-implicit-rejection	2021-03-25 14:28:38.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1k/doc/man1/rsautl.pod	2023-11-17 17:29:02.923553658 +0100
+@@ -103,6 +103,11 @@ special padding used in SSL v2 backwards
+ or no padding, respectively.
+ For signatures, only B<-pkcs> and B<-raw> can be used.
+ 
++Note: because of protection against Bleichenbacher attacks, decryption
++using PKCS#1 v1.5 mode will not return errors in case padding check failed.
++Use B<-raw> and inspect the returned value manually to check if the
++padding is correct.
++
+ =item B<-hexdump>
+ 
+ Hex dump the output data.
+--- openssl-1.1.1k/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey.txt.pkcs1-implicit-rejection	2023-11-17 17:29:02.865552580 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1k/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey.txt	2023-11-17 17:29:02.925553695 +0100
+@@ -352,9 +352,23 @@ Decrypt = RSA-2048
+ Input = 550AF55A2904E7B9762352F8FB7FA235A9CB053AACB2D5FCB8CA48453CB2EE3619746C701ABF2D4CC67003471A187900B05AA812BD25ED05C675DFC8C97A24A7BF49BD6214992CAD766D05A9A2B57B74F26A737E0237B8B76C45F1F226A836D7CFBC75BA999BDBE48DBC09227AA46C88F21DCCBA7840141AD5A5D71FD122E6BD6AC3E564780DFE623FC1CA9B995A6037BF0BBD43B205A84AC5444F34202C05CE9113087176432476576DE6FFFF9A52EA57C08BE3EC2F49676CB8E12F762AC71FA3C321E00AC988910C85FF52F93825666CE0D40FFAA0592078919D4493F46D95CCF76364C6D57760DD0B64805F9AFC76A2365A5575CA301D5103F0EA76CB9A78
+ Output = "Hello World"
+ 
++# Note: disable the Bleichenbacher workaround to see if it passes
++Decrypt = RSA-2048
++Ctrl = rsa_pkcs1_implicit_rejection:0
++Input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
++Output = "Hello World"
++
+ # Corrupted ciphertext
++# Note: output is generated synthethically by the Bleichenbacher workaround
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048
+ Input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
++Output = 4cbb988d6a46228379132b0b5f8c249b3860043848c93632fb982c807c7c82fffc7a9ef83f4908f890373ac181ffea6381e103bcaa27e65638b6ecebef38b59ed4226a9d12af675cfcb634d8c40e7a7aff
++
++# Corrupted ciphertext
++# Note: disable the Bleichenbacher workaround to see if it fails
++Decrypt = RSA-2048
++Ctrl = rsa_pkcs1_implicit_rejection:0
++Input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
+ Output = "Hello World"
+ Result = KEYOP_ERROR
+ 
+@@ -383,6 +397,414 @@ Result = PKEY_CTRL_INVALID
+ Function = pkey_rsa_ctrl
+ Reason = invalid mgf1 md
+ 
++# Test vectors for the Bleichenbacher workaround
++
++PrivateKey = RSA-2048-2
++-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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++-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
++
++# corresponding public key
++PublicKey = RSA-2048-2-PUBLIC
++-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
++MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAyMyDlxQJjaVsqiNkD5Pc
++iZfBY3KWj8Gwxt9RE8HJTosh5IrSKX5lQZARtObY9ec7G3iyV0ADIdHva2AtTsjO
++jRQclJBetK0wZjmkkgZTS25/JgdCPpff/RM8iNchOZ3vvH6WzNy9fzquH+iScSv7
++SSmBfVEWZkQKH6y3ogj16hZZEK3Yo/LUlyAjYMy2MgJPDQcWnBkY8xb3lLFDrvVO
++yHUipMApePlomYC/+/ZJwwfoGBm/+IQJY41IvZS+FStZ/2SfoL1inQ/6GBPDq/S1
++a9PC6lRl3/oUWJKSqdiiStJr5+4FEHQbY4LUPIPVv6QKRmE9BivkRVF9vK8MtOGn
++aQIDAQAB
++-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
++
++PrivPubKeyPair = RSA-2048-2:RSA-2048-2-PUBLIC
++
++# RSA decrypt
++
++# a random positive test case
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = "lorem ipsum dolor sit amet"
++
++# a random negative test case decrypting to empty
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output =
++
++# invalid decrypting to max length message
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = 22d850137b9eebe092b24f602dc5bb7918c16bd89ddbf20467b119d205f9c2e4bd7d2592cf1e532106e0f33557565923c73a02d4f09c0c22bea89148183e60317f7028b3aa1f261f91c979393101d7e15f4067e63979b32751658ef769610fe97cf9cef3278b3117d384051c3b1d82c251c2305418c8f6840530e631aad63e70e20e025bcd8efb54c92ec6d3b106a2f8e64eeff7d38495b0fc50c97138af4b1c0a67a1c4e27b077b8439332edfa8608dfeae653cd6a628ac550395f7e74390e42c11682234870925eeaa1fa71b76cf1f2ee3bda69f6717033ff8b7c95c9799e7a3bea5e7e4a1c359772fb6b1c6e6c516661dfe30c3
++
++# invalid decrypting to message with length specified by second to last value from PRF
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = 0f9b
++
++# invalid decrypting to message with length specified by third to last value from PRF
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = 4f02
++
++# positive test with 11 byte long value
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = "lorem ipsum"
++
++# positive test with 11 byte long value and zero padded ciphertext
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = "lorem ipsum"
++
++# positive test with 11 byte long value and zero truncated ciphertext
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = "lorem ipsum"
++
++# positive test with 11 byte long value and double zero padded ciphertext
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = "lorem ipsum"
++
++# positive test with 11 byte long value and double zero truncated ciphertext
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = "lorem ipsum"
++
++# positive that generates a 0 byte long synthethic message internally
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = "lorem ipsum"
++
++# positive that generates a 245 byte long synthethic message internally
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = "lorem ipsum"
++
++# a random negative test that generates an 11 byte long message
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = af9ac70191c92413cb9f2d
++
++# an otherwise correct plaintext, but with wrong first byte
++# (0x01 instead of 0x00), generates a random 11 byte long plaintext
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = a1f8c9255c35cfba403ccc
++
++# an otherwise correct plaintext, but with wrong second byte
++# (0x01 instead of 0x02), generates a random 11 byte long plaintext
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = e6d700309ca0ed62452254
++
++# an invalid ciphertext, with a zero byte in first byte of
++# ciphertext, decrypts to a random 11 byte long synthethic
++# plaintext
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = ba27b1842e7c21c0e7ef6a
++
++# an invalid ciphertext, with a zero byte removed from first byte of
++# ciphertext, decrypts to a random 11 byte long synthethic
++# plaintext
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = ba27b1842e7c21c0e7ef6a
++
++# an invalid ciphertext, with two zero bytes in first bytes of
++# ciphertext, decrypts to a random 11 byte long synthethic
++# plaintext
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = d5cf555b1d6151029a429a
++
++# an invalid ciphertext, with two zero bytes removed from first bytes of
++# ciphertext, decrypts to a random 11 byte long synthethic
++# plaintext
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 587cccc6b264bdfe0dc2149a988047fa921801f3502ea64624c510c6033d2f427e3f136c26e88ea9f6519e86a542cec96aad1e5e9013c3cc203b6de15a69183050813af5c9ad79703136d4b92f50ce171eefc6aa7988ecf02f319ffc5eafd6ee7a137f8fce64b255bb1b8dd19cfe767d64fdb468b9b2e9e7a0c24dae03239c8c714d3f40b7ee9c4e59ac15b17e4d328f1100756bce17133e8e7493b54e5006c3cbcdacd134130c5132a1edebdbd01a0c41452d16ed7a0788003c34730d0808e7e14c797a21f2b45a8aa1644357fd5e988f99b017d9df37563a354c788dc0e2f9466045622fa3f3e17db63414d27761f57392623a2bef6467501c63e8d645
++Output = d5cf555b1d6151029a429a
++
++# and invalid ciphertext, otherwise valid but starting with 000002, decrypts
++# to random 11 byte long synthethic plaintext
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = 3d4a054d9358209e9cbbb9
++
++# negative test with otherwise valid padding but a zero byte in first byte
++# of padding
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 179598823812d2c58a7eb50521150a48bcca8b4eb53414018b6bca19f4801456c5e36a940037ac516b0d6412ba44ec6b4f268a55ef1c5ffbf18a2f4e3522bb7b6ed89774b79bffa22f7d3102165565642de0d43a955e96a1f2e80e5430671d7266eb4f905dc8ff5e106dc5588e5b0289e49a4913940e392a97062616d2bda38155471b7d360cfb94681c702f60ed2d4de614ea72bf1c53160e63179f6c5b897b59492bee219108309f0b7b8cb2b136c346a5e98b8b4b8415fb1d713bae067911e3057f1c335b4b7e39101eafd5d28f0189037e4334f4fdb9038427b1d119a6702aa8233319cc97d496cc289ae8c956ddc84042659a2d43d6aa22f12b81ab884e
++Output = 1f037dd717b07d3e7f7359
++
++# negative test with otherwise valid padding but a zero byte at the eigth
++# byte of padding
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = 63cb0bf65fc8255dd29e17
++
++# negative test with an otherwise valid plaintext but with missing separator
++# byte
++Decrypt = RSA-2048-2
++Input = 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
++Output = 6f09a0b62699337c497b0b
++
++# Test vectors for the Bleichenbacher workaround (2049 bit key size)
++
++PrivateKey = RSA-2049
++-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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++-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
++
++# corresponding public key
++PublicKey = RSA-2049-PUBLIC
++-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
++MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEBVfiJVWoXdfHHp3hqULGL
++woyemG7eVmfKs5uEEk6Q66dcHbCDrD5EO7qU3CNWD3XjqBaToqQ73HQm2MTq/mjI
++XeD+dX9uSbue1EfmAkMIANuwTOsi5/pXoY0zj7ZgJs20Z+cMwEDn02fvQDx78ePf
++YkZQCUYx8h6v0vtbyRX/BDeazRES9zLAtGYHwXjTiiD1LtpQny+cBAXVEGnoDM+U
++FVTQRwRnUFw89UHqCJffyfQAzsspj/x1M3LZ9pM68XTMQO2W1GcDFzO5f4zd0/kr
++w6A+qFdsQX8kAHteT3UBEFtUTen63N/635jftLsFuBmfP4Ws/ZH3qaCUuaOD9QSQ
++lwIDAQAB
++-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
++
++PrivPubKeyPair = RSA-2049:RSA-2049-PUBLIC
++
++# RSA decrypt
++
++# malformed that generates length specified by 3rd last value from PRF
++Decrypt = RSA-2049
++Input = 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
++Output = 42
++
++# simple positive test case
++Decrypt = RSA-2049
++Input = 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
++Output = "lorem ipsum"
++
++# positive test case with null padded ciphertext
++Decrypt = RSA-2049
++Input = 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
++Output = "lorem ipsum"
++
++# positive test case with null truncated ciphertext
++Decrypt = RSA-2049
++Input = 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
++Output = "lorem ipsum"
++
++# positive test case with double null padded ciphertext
++Decrypt = RSA-2049
++Input = 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
++Output = "lorem ipsum"
++
++# positive test case with double null truncated ciphertext
++Decrypt = RSA-2049
++Input = 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
++Output = "lorem ipsum"
++
++# a random negative test case that generates an 11 byte long message
++Decrypt = RSA-2049
++Input = 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
++Output = 1189b6f5498fd6df532b00
++
++# otherwise correct plaintext, but with wrong first byte (0x01 instead of 0x00)
++Decrypt = RSA-2049
++Input = 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
++Output = f6d0f5b78082fe61c04674
++
++# otherwise correct plaintext, but with wrong second byte (0x01 instead of 0x02)
++Decrypt = RSA-2049
++Input = 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
++Output = 1ab287fcef3ff17067914d
++
++# RSA decrypt with 3072 bit keys
++PrivateKey = RSA-3072
++-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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++-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
++
++PublicKey = RSA-3072-PUBLIC
++-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----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++-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
++
++PrivPubKeyPair = RSA-3072:RSA-3072-PUBLIC
++
++# a random invalid ciphertext that generates an empty synthethic one
++Decrypt = RSA-3072
++Input = 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
++Output =
++
++# a random invalid that has PRF output with a length one byte too long
++# in the last value
++Decrypt = RSA-3072
++Input = 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
++Output = 56a3bea054e01338be9b7d7957539c
++
++# a random invalid that generates a synthethic of maximum size
++Decrypt = RSA-3072
++Input = 1715065322522dff85049800f6a29ab5f98c465020467414b2a44127fe9446da47fa18047900f99afe67c2df6f50160bb8e90bff296610fde632b3859d4d0d2e644f23835028c46cca01b84b88231d7e03154edec6627bcba23de76740d839851fa12d74c8f92e540c73fe837b91b7d699b311997d5f0f7864c486d499c3a79c111faaacbe4799597a25066c6200215c3d158f3817c1aa57f18bdaad0be1658da9da93f5cc6c3c4dd72788af57adbb6a0c26f42d32d95b8a4f95e8c6feb2f8a5d53b19a50a0b7cbc25e055ad03e5ace8f3f7db13e57759f67b65d143f08cca15992c6b2aae643390483de111c2988d4e76b42596266005103c8de6044fb7398eb3c28a864fa672de5fd8774510ff45e05969a11a4c7d3f343e331190d2dcf24fb9154ba904dc94af98afc5774a9617d0418fe6d13f8245c7d7626c176138dd698a23547c25f27c2b98ea4d8a45c7842b81888e4cc14e5b72e9cf91f56956c93dbf2e5f44a8282a7813157fc481ff1371a0f66b31797e81ebdb09a673d4db96d6
++Output = 7b036fcd6243900e4236c894e2462c17738acc87e01a76f4d95cb9a328d9acde81650283b8e8f60a217e3bdee835c7b222ad4c85d0acdb9a309bd2a754609a65dec50f3aa04c6d5891034566b9563d42668ede1f8992b17753a2132e28970584e255efc8b45a41c5dbd7567f014acec5fe6fdb6d484790360a913ebb9defcd74ff377f2a8ba46d2ed85f733c9a3da08eb57ecedfafda806778f03c66b2c5d2874cec1c291b2d49eb194c7b5d0dd2908ae90f4843268a2c45563092ade08acb6ab481a08176102fc803fbb2f8ad11b0e1531bd37df543498daf180b12017f4d4d426ca29b4161075534bfb914968088a9d13785d0adc0e2580d3548494b2a9e91605f2b27e6cc701c796f0de7c6f471f6ab6cb9272a1ed637ca32a60d117505d82af3c1336104afb537d01a8f70b510e1eebf4869cb976c419473795a66c7f5e6e20a8094b1bb603a74330c537c5c0698c31538bd2e138c1275a1bdf24c5fa8ab3b7b526324e7918a382d1363b3d463764222150e04
++
++# a positive test case that decrypts to 9 byte long value
++Decrypt = RSA-3072
++Input = 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
++Output = "forty two"
++
++# a positive test case with null padded ciphertext
++Decrypt = RSA-3072
++Input = 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
++Output = "forty two"
++
++# a positive test case with null truncated ciphertext
++Decrypt = RSA-3072
++Input = 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
++Output = "forty two"
++
++# a positive test case with double null padded ciphertext
++Decrypt = RSA-3072
++Input = 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
++Output = "forty two"
++
++# a positive test case with double null truncated ciphertext
++Decrypt = RSA-3072
++Input = 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
++Output = "forty two"
++
++# a random negative test case that generates a 9 byte long message
++Decrypt = RSA-3072
++Input = 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
++Output = 257906ca6de8307728
++
++# a random negative test case that generates a 9 byte long message based on
++# second to last value from PRF
++Decrypt = RSA-3072
++Input = 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
++Output = 043383c929060374ed
++
++# a random negative test that generates message based on 3rd last value from
++# PRF
++Decrypt = RSA-3072
++Input = 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
++Output = 70263fa6050534b9e0
++
++# an otherwise valid plaintext, but with wrong first byte (0x01 instead of 0x00)
++Decrypt = RSA-3072
++Input = 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
++Output = 6d8d3a094ff3afff4c
++
++# an otherwise valid plaintext, but with wrong second byte (0x01 instead of 0x02)
++Decrypt = RSA-3072
++Input = 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
++Output = c6ae80ffa80bc184b0
++
++# an otherwise valid plaintext, but with zero byte in first byte of padding
++Decrypt = RSA-3072
++Input = 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
++Output = a8a9301daa01bb25c7
++
++# an otherwise valid plaintext, but with zero byte in eight byte of padding
++Decrypt = RSA-3072
++Input = 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
++Output = 6c716fe01d44398018
++
++# an otherwise valid plaintext, but with null separator missing
++Decrypt = RSA-3072
++Input = 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
++Output = aa2de6cde4e2442884
++
+ # RSA PSS key tests
+ 
+ # PSS only key, no parameter restrictions
+--- openssl-1.1.1k/include/openssl/rsa.h.pkcs1-implicit-rejection	2021-03-25 14:28:38.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1k/include/openssl/rsa.h	2023-11-17 17:29:02.923553658 +0100
+@@ -182,6 +182,8 @@ extern "C" {
+ 
+ # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PRIMES  (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 13)
+ 
++# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_IMPLICIT_REJECTION (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 14)
++
+ # define RSA_PKCS1_PADDING       1
+ # define RSA_SSLV23_PADDING      2
+ # define RSA_NO_PADDING          3
+@@ -190,6 +192,9 @@ extern "C" {
+ /* EVP_PKEY_ only */
+ # define RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING   6
+ 
++/* internal RSA_ only */
++# define RSA_PKCS1_NO_IMPLICIT_REJECT_PADDING 8
++
+ # define RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE  11
+ 
+ # define RSA_set_app_data(s,arg)         RSA_set_ex_data(s,0,arg)
+--- openssl-1.1.1k/crypto/rsa/rsa_local.h.pkcs1-implicit-rejection	2023-11-17 17:29:02.616547958 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1k/crypto/rsa/rsa_local.h	2023-11-17 17:29:02.922553639 +0100
+@@ -124,6 +124,9 @@ RSA_PSS_PARAMS *rsa_pss_params_create(co
+                                       const EVP_MD *mgf1md, int saltlen);
+ int rsa_pss_get_param(const RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss, const EVP_MD **pmd,
+                       const EVP_MD **pmgf1md, int *psaltlen);
++int ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
++                                        const unsigned char *from, int flen,
++                                        int num, unsigned char *kdk);
+ /* internal function to clear and free multi-prime parameters */
+ void rsa_multip_info_free_ex(RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo);
+ void rsa_multip_info_free(RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo);
+--- openssl-1.1.1k/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c.pkcs1-implicit-rejection	2023-11-17 17:29:02.911553435 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1k/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c	2023-11-17 17:29:02.922553639 +0100
+@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@
+ #include "crypto/bn.h"
+ #include "rsa_local.h"
+ #include "internal/constant_time.h"
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <openssl/sha.h>
++#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+ 
+ #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ # include <openssl/fips.h>
+@@ -412,8 +415,13 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int
+     BIGNUM *f, *ret;
+     int j, num = 0, r = -1;
+     unsigned char *buf = NULL;
++    unsigned char d_hash[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH] = {0};
++    HMAC_CTX *hmac = NULL;
++    unsigned int md_len = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
++    unsigned char kdk[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH] = {0};
+     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+     int local_blinding = 0;
++    const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+     /*
+      * Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
+      * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
+@@ -438,6 +446,12 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int
+     }
+ # endif
+ 
++    /*
++     * we need the value of the private exponent to perform implicit rejection
++     */
++    if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) && (padding == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING))
++        padding = RSA_PKCS1_NO_IMPLICIT_REJECT_PADDING;
++
+     if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+         goto err;
+     BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+@@ -460,6 +474,11 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int
+         goto err;
+     }
+ 
++    if (flen < 1) {
++        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL);
++        goto err;
++    }
++
+     /* make data into a big number */
+     if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, f) == NULL)
+         goto err;
+@@ -523,6 +542,81 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int
+         BN_free(d);
+     }
+ 
++    /*
++     * derive the Key Derivation Key from private exponent and public
++     * ciphertext
++     */
++    if (padding == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
++        /*
++         * because we use d as a handle to rsa->d we need to keep it local and
++         * free before any further use of rsa->d
++         */
++        BIGNUM *d = BN_new();
++        if (d == NULL) {
++            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++            goto err;
++        }
++        if (rsa->d == NULL) {
++            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_MISSING_PRIVATE_KEY);
++            BN_free(d);
++            goto err;
++        }
++        BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
++        if (BN_bn2binpad(d, buf, num) < 0) {
++            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++            BN_free(d);
++            goto err;
++        }
++        BN_free(d);
++
++        /*
++         * we use hardcoded hash so that migrating between versions that use
++         * different hash doesn't provide a Bleichenbacher oracle:
++         * if the attacker can see that different versions return different
++         * messages for the same ciphertext, they'll know that the message is
++         * syntethically generated, which means that the padding check failed
++         */
++        md = EVP_sha256();
++        if (md == NULL) {
++            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++            goto err;
++        }
++
++        if (EVP_Digest(buf, num, d_hash, NULL, md, NULL) <= 0) {
++            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++            goto err;
++        }
++
++        hmac = HMAC_CTX_new();
++        if (hmac == NULL) {
++            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++            goto err;
++        }
++
++        if (HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, d_hash, sizeof(d_hash), md, NULL) <= 0) {
++            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++            goto err;
++        }
++
++        if (flen < num) {
++            memset(buf, 0, num - flen);
++            if (HMAC_Update(hmac, buf, num - flen) <= 0) {
++                RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++                goto err;
++            }
++        }
++        if (HMAC_Update(hmac, from, flen) <= 0) {
++            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++            goto err;
++        }
++
++        md_len = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
++        if (HMAC_Final(hmac, kdk, &md_len) <= 0) {
++            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++            goto err;
++        }
++    }
++
+     if (blinding) {
+         /*
+          * ossl_bn_rsa_do_unblind() combines blinding inversion and
+@@ -539,9 +633,12 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int
+     }
+ 
+     switch (padding) {
+-    case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
++    case RSA_PKCS1_NO_IMPLICIT_REJECT_PADDING:
+         r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, buf, j, num);
+         break;
++    case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
++        r = ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, buf, j, num, kdk);
++        break;
+     case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
+         r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, buf, j, num, NULL, 0);
+         break;
+@@ -559,6 +656,7 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int
+     err_clear_last_constant_time(1 & ~constant_time_msb(r));
+ 
+  err:
++    HMAC_CTX_free(hmac);
+     BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+     BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+     OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num);
+--- openssl-1.1.1k/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c.pkcs1-implicit-rejection	2021-03-25 14:28:38.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1k/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c	2023-11-17 17:29:02.922553639 +0100
+@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@
+ 
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <openssl/sha.h>
++#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+ #include <openssl/rsa.h>
+ #include <openssl/rand.h>
+@@ -253,3 +256,248 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsig
+ 
+     return constant_time_select_int(good, mlen, -1);
+ }
++
++static int ossl_rsa_prf(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
++                        const char *label, int llen,
++                        const unsigned char *kdk,
++                        uint16_t bitlen)
++{
++    int pos;
++    int ret = -1;
++    uint16_t iter = 0;
++    unsigned char be_iter[sizeof(iter)];
++    unsigned char be_bitlen[sizeof(bitlen)];
++    HMAC_CTX *hmac = NULL;
++    const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
++    unsigned char hmac_out[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
++    unsigned int md_len;
++
++    if (tlen * 8 != bitlen) {
++        RSAerr(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++        return ret;
++    }
++
++    be_bitlen[0] = (bitlen >> 8) & 0xff;
++    be_bitlen[1] = bitlen & 0xff;
++
++    hmac = HMAC_CTX_new();
++    if (hmac == NULL) {
++        RSAerr(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++        goto err;
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * we use hardcoded hash so that migrating between versions that use
++     * different hash doesn't provide a Bleichenbacher oracle:
++     * if the attacker can see that different versions return different
++     * messages for the same ciphertext, they'll know that the message is
++     * syntethically generated, which means that the padding check failed
++     */
++    md = EVP_sha256();
++    if (md == NULL) {
++        RSAerr(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++        goto err;
++    }
++
++    if (HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, kdk, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, md, NULL) <= 0) {
++        RSAerr(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++        goto err;
++    }
++
++    for (pos = 0; pos < tlen; pos += SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, iter++) {
++        if (HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL) <= 0) {
++            RSAerr(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++            goto err;
++        }
++
++        be_iter[0] = (iter >> 8) & 0xff;
++        be_iter[1] = iter & 0xff;
++
++        if (HMAC_Update(hmac, be_iter, sizeof(be_iter)) <= 0) {
++            RSAerr(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++            goto err;
++        }
++        if (HMAC_Update(hmac, (unsigned char *)label, llen) <= 0) {
++            RSAerr(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++            goto err;
++        }
++        if (HMAC_Update(hmac, be_bitlen, sizeof(be_bitlen)) <= 0) {
++            RSAerr(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++            goto err;
++        }
++
++        /*
++         * HMAC_Final requires the output buffer to fit the whole MAC
++         * value, so we need to use the intermediate buffer for the last
++         * unaligned block
++         */
++        md_len = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
++        if (pos + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH > tlen) {
++            if (HMAC_Final(hmac, hmac_out, &md_len) <= 0) {
++                RSAerr(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++                goto err;
++            }
++            memcpy(to + pos, hmac_out, tlen - pos);
++        } else {
++            if (HMAC_Final(hmac, to + pos, &md_len) <= 0) {
++                RSAerr(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++                goto err;
++            }
++        }
++    }
++
++    ret = 0;
++
++err:
++    HMAC_CTX_free(hmac);
++    return ret;
++}
++
++/*
++ * ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2() checks and removes the PKCS#1 type 2
++ * padding from a decrypted RSA message. Unlike the
++ * RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2() it will not return an error in case it
++ * detects a padding error, rather it will return a deterministically generated
++ * random message. In other words it will perform an implicit rejection
++ * of an invalid padding. This means that the returned value does not indicate
++ * if the padding of the encrypted message was correct or not, making
++ * side channel attacks like the ones described by Bleichenbacher impossible
++ * without access to the full decrypted value and a brute-force search of
++ * remaining padding bytes
++ */
++int ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
++                                        const unsigned char *from, int flen,
++                                        int num, unsigned char *kdk)
++{
++/*
++ * We need to generate a random length for the synthethic message, to avoid
++ * bias towards zero and avoid non-constant timeness of DIV, we prepare
++ * 128 values to check if they are not too large for the used key size,
++ * and use 0 in case none of them are small enough, as 2^-128 is a good enough
++ * safety margin
++ */
++#define MAX_LEN_GEN_TRIES 128
++    unsigned char *synthetic = NULL;
++    int synthethic_length;
++    uint16_t len_candidate;
++    unsigned char candidate_lengths[MAX_LEN_GEN_TRIES * sizeof(len_candidate)];
++    uint16_t len_mask;
++    uint16_t max_sep_offset;
++    int synth_msg_index = 0;
++    int ret = -1;
++    int i, j;
++    unsigned int good, found_zero_byte;
++    int zero_index = 0, msg_index;
++
++    /*
++     * If these checks fail then either the message in publicly invalid, or
++     * we've been called incorrectly. We can fail immediately.
++     * Since this code is called only internally by openssl, those are just
++     * sanity checks
++     */
++    if (num != flen || tlen <= 0 || flen <= 0) {
++        RSAerr(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++        return -1;
++    }
++
++    /* Generate a random message to return in case the padding checks fail */
++    synthetic = OPENSSL_malloc(flen);
++    if (synthetic == NULL) {
++        RSAerr(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++        return -1;
++    }
++
++    if (ossl_rsa_prf(synthetic, flen, "message", 7, kdk, flen * 8) < 0)
++        goto err;
++
++    /* decide how long the random message should be */
++    if (ossl_rsa_prf(candidate_lengths, sizeof(candidate_lengths),
++                     "length", 6, kdk,
++                     MAX_LEN_GEN_TRIES * sizeof(len_candidate) * 8) < 0)
++        goto err;
++
++    /*
++     * max message size is the size of the modulus size less 2 bytes for
++     * version and padding type and a minimum of 8 bytes padding
++     */
++    len_mask = max_sep_offset = flen - 2 - 8;
++    /*
++     * we want a mask so lets propagate the high bit to all positions less
++     * significant than it
++     */
++    len_mask |= len_mask >> 1;
++    len_mask |= len_mask >> 2;
++    len_mask |= len_mask >> 4;
++    len_mask |= len_mask >> 8;
++
++    synthethic_length = 0;
++    for (i = 0; i < MAX_LEN_GEN_TRIES * (int)sizeof(len_candidate);
++            i += sizeof(len_candidate)) {
++        len_candidate = (candidate_lengths[i] << 8) | candidate_lengths[i + 1];
++        len_candidate &= len_mask;
++
++        synthethic_length = constant_time_select_int(
++            constant_time_lt(len_candidate, max_sep_offset),
++            len_candidate, synthethic_length);
++    }
++
++    synth_msg_index = flen - synthethic_length;
++
++    /* we have alternative message ready, check the real one */
++    good = constant_time_is_zero(from[0]);
++    good &= constant_time_eq(from[1], 2);
++
++    /* then look for the padding|message separator (the first zero byte) */
++    found_zero_byte = 0;
++    for (i = 2; i < flen; i++) {
++        unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(from[i]);
++        zero_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0,
++                                              i, zero_index);
++        found_zero_byte |= equals0;
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * padding must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into
++     * |from|. If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check
++     * also fails.
++     */
++    good &= constant_time_ge(zero_index, 2 + 8);
++
++    /*
++     * Skip the zero byte. This is incorrect if we never found a zero-byte
++     * but in this case we also do not copy the message out.
++     */
++    msg_index = zero_index + 1;
++
++    /*
++     * old code returned an error in case the decrypted message wouldn't fit
++     * into the |to|, since that would leak information, return the synthethic
++     * message instead
++     */
++    good &= constant_time_ge(tlen, num - msg_index);
++
++    msg_index = constant_time_select_int(good, msg_index, synth_msg_index);
++
++    /*
++     * since at this point the |msg_index| does not provide the signal
++     * indicating if the padding check failed or not, we don't have to worry
++     * about leaking the length of returned message, we still need to ensure
++     * that we read contents of both buffers so that cache accesses don't leak
++     * the value of |good|
++     */
++    for (i = msg_index, j = 0; i < flen && j < tlen; i++, j++)
++        to[j] = constant_time_select_8(good, from[i], synthetic[i]);
++    ret = j;
++
++err:
++    /*
++     * the only time ret < 0 is when the ciphertext is publicly invalid
++     * or we were called with invalid parameters, so we don't have to perform
++     * a side-channel secure raising of the error
++     */
++    if (ret < 0)
++        RSAerr(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++    OPENSSL_free(synthetic);
++    return ret;
++}
++
+--- openssl-1.1.1k/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c.pkcs1-implicit-rejection	2023-11-17 17:29:02.863552544 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1k/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c	2023-11-17 17:29:02.922553639 +0100
+@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ typedef struct {
+     /* OAEP label */
+     unsigned char *oaep_label;
+     size_t oaep_labellen;
++    /* if to use implicit rejection in PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption */
++    int implicit_rejection;
+ } RSA_PKEY_CTX;
+ 
+ /* True if PSS parameters are restricted */
+@@ -65,6 +67,7 @@ static int pkey_rsa_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *c
+     /* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */
+     rctx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
+     rctx->min_saltlen = -1;
++    rctx->implicit_rejection = 1;
+     ctx->data = rctx;
+     ctx->keygen_info = rctx->gentmp;
+     ctx->keygen_info_count = 2;
+@@ -89,6 +92,7 @@ static int pkey_rsa_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *d
+     dctx->pad_mode = sctx->pad_mode;
+     dctx->md = sctx->md;
+     dctx->mgf1md = sctx->mgf1md;
++    dctx->implicit_rejection = sctx->implicit_rejection;
+     if (sctx->oaep_label) {
+         OPENSSL_free(dctx->oaep_label);
+         dctx->oaep_label = OPENSSL_memdup(sctx->oaep_label, sctx->oaep_labellen);
+@@ -324,6 +328,7 @@ static int pkey_rsa_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX
+                             const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
+ {
+     int ret;
++    int pad_mode;
+     RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+ 
+     if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
+@@ -339,8 +344,12 @@ static int pkey_rsa_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX
+                                                 rctx->oaep_labellen,
+                                                 rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md);
+     } else {
+-        ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, out, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
+-                                  rctx->pad_mode);
++        if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING &&
++              rctx->implicit_rejection == 0)
++            pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_NO_IMPLICIT_REJECT_PADDING;
++        else
++            pad_mode = rctx->pad_mode;
++        ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, out, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa, pad_mode);
+     }
+     *outlen = constant_time_select_s(constant_time_msb_s(ret), *outlen, ret);
+     ret = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_msb(ret), ret, 1);
+@@ -559,6 +568,14 @@ static int pkey_rsa_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *c
+         *(unsigned char **)p2 = rctx->oaep_label;
+         return rctx->oaep_labellen;
+ 
++    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_IMPLICIT_REJECTION:
++        if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
++            RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
++            return -2;
++        }
++        rctx->implicit_rejection = p1;
++        return 1;
++
+     case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT:
+     case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN:
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+@@ -695,6 +712,19 @@ static int pkey_rsa_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CT
+         return ret;
+     }
+ 
++    if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pkcs1_implicit_rejection") == 0) {
++        if (value == NULL)
++            return -1;
++
++        if (strcmp(value, "0") == 0)
++            return pkey_rsa_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_IMPLICIT_REJECTION, 0, NULL); 
++
++        if (strcmp(value, "1") == 0)
++            return pkey_rsa_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_IMPLICIT_REJECTION, 1, NULL); 
++
++        return -2;
++    }
++
+     return -2;
+ }
+ 
+--- openssl-1.1.1k/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c.pkcs1-implicit-rejection	2021-03-25 14:28:38.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1k/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c	2023-11-17 17:29:02.922553639 +0100
+@@ -159,6 +159,13 @@ static int pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(unsigned
+         goto err;
+     }
+ 
++    if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
++        /* upper layer pkcs7 code incorrectly assumes that a successful RSA
++         * decryption means that the key matches ciphertext (which never
++         * was the case, implicit rejection or not), so to make it work
++         * disable implicit rejection for RSA keys */
++        EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_IMPLICIT_REJECTION, 0, NULL);
++
+     if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pctx, NULL, &eklen,
+                          ri->enc_key->data, ri->enc_key->length) <= 0)
+         goto err;
+--- openssl-1.1.1k/crypto/cms/cms_env.c.pkcs1-implicit-rejection	2021-03-25 14:28:38.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1k/crypto/cms/cms_env.c	2023-11-17 17:29:02.922553639 +0100
+@@ -401,6 +401,13 @@ static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_decryp
+         goto err;
+     }
+ 
++    if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
++        /* upper layer CMS code incorrectly assumes that a successful RSA
++         * decryption means that the key matches ciphertext (which never
++         * was the case, implicit rejection or not), so to make it work
++         * disable implicit rejection for RSA keys */
++        EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ktri->pctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_IMPLICIT_REJECTION, 0, NULL);
++
+     if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ktri->pctx, NULL, &eklen,
+                          ktri->encryptedKey->data,
+                          ktri->encryptedKey->length) <= 0)
diff --git a/SPECS/openssl/openssl.spec b/SPECS/openssl/openssl.spec
index f7c06c707b7..f7a5707b41b 100644
--- a/SPECS/openssl/openssl.spec
+++ b/SPECS/openssl/openssl.spec
@@ -61,7 +61,11 @@ Patch37:        CVE-2023-3817.patch
 Patch38:        openssl-1.1.1-improve-safety-of-DH.patch
 Patch39:        openssl-1.1.1-add-null-checks-where-contentinfo-data-can-be-null.patch
 Patch40:        openssl-1.1.1-Fix-unconstrained-session-cache-growth-in-TLSv1.3.patch
+<<<<<<< HEAD
 Patch41:        openssl-1.1.1-Only-free-the-read-buffers-if-we-re-not-using-them.patch
+=======
+Patch41:        openssl-1.1.1-pkcs1-implicit-rejection.patch
+>>>>>>> 92416a752 (openssl: Fix CVE-2023-50782 affecting python-cryptography (#9209))
 BuildRequires:  perl-Test-Warnings
 BuildRequires:  perl-Text-Template
 BuildRequires:  perl(FindBin)
@@ -365,10 +369,17 @@ rm -f %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/pki/tls/ct_log_list.cnf.dist
 %postun libs -p /sbin/ldconfig
 
 %changelog
+<<<<<<< HEAD
 * Tue Jun 04 2024 Tobias Brick <tobiasb@microsoft.com> - 1.1.1k-31
 - Only free the read buffers if we're not using them
 
 * Fri Apr 19 2024 Tobias Brick <tobiasb@microsoft.com> - 1.1.1k-30
+=======
+* Thu May 23 2024 Juan Camposeco <juan.camposeco@gmail.com> - 1.1.1k-31
+- Implicit rejection of PKCS#1 v1.5 (CVE-2023-50782)
+
+* Fri Apr 19 2024 Tobias Brick <tobaisb@microsoft.com> - 1.1.1k-30
+>>>>>>> 92416a752 (openssl: Fix CVE-2023-50782 affecting python-cryptography (#9209))
 - Fix unconstrained session cache growth in TLSv1.3
 
 * Wed Feb 14 2024 Tobias Brick <tobiasb@microsoft.com> - 1.1.1k-29

From 6a208d86ab947707ac1c06ba837a7967aabb2fcb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Juan Camposeco <juanarturoc@microsoft.com>
Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2024 12:49:12 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 2/4] resolve conflicts with openssl ver 1.1.1-31

---
 SPECS/openssl/openssl.spec                     | 18 ++++++------------
 .../manifests/package/pkggen_core_aarch64.txt  | 10 +++++-----
 .../manifests/package/pkggen_core_x86_64.txt   | 10 +++++-----
 .../manifests/package/toolchain_aarch64.txt    | 12 ++++++------
 .../manifests/package/toolchain_x86_64.txt     | 12 ++++++------
 5 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)

diff --git a/SPECS/openssl/openssl.spec b/SPECS/openssl/openssl.spec
index f7a5707b41b..4ff1d7909a5 100644
--- a/SPECS/openssl/openssl.spec
+++ b/SPECS/openssl/openssl.spec
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 Summary:        Utilities from the general purpose cryptography library with TLS implementation
 Name:           openssl
 Version:        1.1.1k
-Release:        31%{?dist}
+Release:        32%{?dist}
 License:        OpenSSL
 Vendor:         Microsoft Corporation
 Distribution:   Mariner
@@ -61,11 +61,8 @@ Patch37:        CVE-2023-3817.patch
 Patch38:        openssl-1.1.1-improve-safety-of-DH.patch
 Patch39:        openssl-1.1.1-add-null-checks-where-contentinfo-data-can-be-null.patch
 Patch40:        openssl-1.1.1-Fix-unconstrained-session-cache-growth-in-TLSv1.3.patch
-<<<<<<< HEAD
 Patch41:        openssl-1.1.1-Only-free-the-read-buffers-if-we-re-not-using-them.patch
-=======
-Patch41:        openssl-1.1.1-pkcs1-implicit-rejection.patch
->>>>>>> 92416a752 (openssl: Fix CVE-2023-50782 affecting python-cryptography (#9209))
+Patch42:        openssl-1.1.1-pkcs1-implicit-rejection.patch
 BuildRequires:  perl-Test-Warnings
 BuildRequires:  perl-Text-Template
 BuildRequires:  perl(FindBin)
@@ -180,6 +177,7 @@ cp %{SOURCE4} test/
 %patch39 -p1
 %patch40 -p1
 %patch41 -p1
+%patch42 -p1
 
 %build
 # Add -Wa,--noexecstack here so that libcrypto's assembler modules will be
@@ -369,17 +367,13 @@ rm -f %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/pki/tls/ct_log_list.cnf.dist
 %postun libs -p /sbin/ldconfig
 
 %changelog
-<<<<<<< HEAD
+* Thu May 23 2024 Juan Camposeco <juan.camposeco@gmail.com> - 1.1.1k-32
+ - Implicit rejection of PKCS#1 v1.5 (CVE-2023-50782) - cherrypick from fasttrack/2.0
+
 * Tue Jun 04 2024 Tobias Brick <tobiasb@microsoft.com> - 1.1.1k-31
 - Only free the read buffers if we're not using them
 
-* Fri Apr 19 2024 Tobias Brick <tobiasb@microsoft.com> - 1.1.1k-30
-=======
-* Thu May 23 2024 Juan Camposeco <juan.camposeco@gmail.com> - 1.1.1k-31
-- Implicit rejection of PKCS#1 v1.5 (CVE-2023-50782)
-
 * Fri Apr 19 2024 Tobias Brick <tobaisb@microsoft.com> - 1.1.1k-30
->>>>>>> 92416a752 (openssl: Fix CVE-2023-50782 affecting python-cryptography (#9209))
 - Fix unconstrained session cache growth in TLSv1.3
 
 * Wed Feb 14 2024 Tobias Brick <tobiasb@microsoft.com> - 1.1.1k-29
diff --git a/toolkit/resources/manifests/package/pkggen_core_aarch64.txt b/toolkit/resources/manifests/package/pkggen_core_aarch64.txt
index 7a10f66b261..d6027f1f6a0 100644
--- a/toolkit/resources/manifests/package/pkggen_core_aarch64.txt
+++ b/toolkit/resources/manifests/package/pkggen_core_aarch64.txt
@@ -165,11 +165,11 @@ texinfo-6.8-1.cm2.aarch64.rpm
 gtk-doc-1.33.2-1.cm2.noarch.rpm
 autoconf-2.71-3.cm2.noarch.rpm
 automake-1.16.5-1.cm2.noarch.rpm
-openssl-1.1.1k-31.cm2.aarch64.rpm
-openssl-devel-1.1.1k-31.cm2.aarch64.rpm
-openssl-libs-1.1.1k-31.cm2.aarch64.rpm
-openssl-perl-1.1.1k-31.cm2.aarch64.rpm
-openssl-static-1.1.1k-31.cm2.aarch64.rpm
+openssl-1.1.1k-32.cm2.aarch64.rpm
+openssl-devel-1.1.1k-32.cm2.aarch64.rpm
+openssl-libs-1.1.1k-32.cm2.aarch64.rpm
+openssl-perl-1.1.1k-32.cm2.aarch64.rpm
+openssl-static-1.1.1k-32.cm2.aarch64.rpm
 libcap-2.60-2.cm2.aarch64.rpm
 libcap-devel-2.60-2.cm2.aarch64.rpm
 debugedit-5.0-2.cm2.aarch64.rpm
diff --git a/toolkit/resources/manifests/package/pkggen_core_x86_64.txt b/toolkit/resources/manifests/package/pkggen_core_x86_64.txt
index 18b0d860c1b..28239c9935c 100644
--- a/toolkit/resources/manifests/package/pkggen_core_x86_64.txt
+++ b/toolkit/resources/manifests/package/pkggen_core_x86_64.txt
@@ -165,11 +165,11 @@ texinfo-6.8-1.cm2.x86_64.rpm
 gtk-doc-1.33.2-1.cm2.noarch.rpm
 autoconf-2.71-3.cm2.noarch.rpm
 automake-1.16.5-1.cm2.noarch.rpm
-openssl-1.1.1k-31.cm2.x86_64.rpm
-openssl-devel-1.1.1k-31.cm2.x86_64.rpm
-openssl-libs-1.1.1k-31.cm2.x86_64.rpm
-openssl-perl-1.1.1k-31.cm2.x86_64.rpm
-openssl-static-1.1.1k-31.cm2.x86_64.rpm
+openssl-1.1.1k-32.cm2.x86_64.rpm
+openssl-devel-1.1.1k-32.cm2.x86_64.rpm
+openssl-libs-1.1.1k-32.cm2.x86_64.rpm
+openssl-perl-1.1.1k-32.cm2.x86_64.rpm
+openssl-static-1.1.1k-32.cm2.x86_64.rpm
 libcap-2.60-2.cm2.x86_64.rpm
 libcap-devel-2.60-2.cm2.x86_64.rpm
 debugedit-5.0-2.cm2.x86_64.rpm
diff --git a/toolkit/resources/manifests/package/toolchain_aarch64.txt b/toolkit/resources/manifests/package/toolchain_aarch64.txt
index d73f50d3e6b..6b52e026b31 100644
--- a/toolkit/resources/manifests/package/toolchain_aarch64.txt
+++ b/toolkit/resources/manifests/package/toolchain_aarch64.txt
@@ -270,12 +270,12 @@ npth-1.6-4.cm2.aarch64.rpm
 npth-debuginfo-1.6-4.cm2.aarch64.rpm
 npth-devel-1.6-4.cm2.aarch64.rpm
 ntsysv-1.20-4.cm2.aarch64.rpm
-openssl-1.1.1k-31.cm2.aarch64.rpm
-openssl-debuginfo-1.1.1k-31.cm2.aarch64.rpm
-openssl-devel-1.1.1k-31.cm2.aarch64.rpm
-openssl-libs-1.1.1k-31.cm2.aarch64.rpm
-openssl-perl-1.1.1k-31.cm2.aarch64.rpm
-openssl-static-1.1.1k-31.cm2.aarch64.rpm
+openssl-1.1.1k-32.cm2.aarch64.rpm
+openssl-debuginfo-1.1.1k-32.cm2.aarch64.rpm
+openssl-devel-1.1.1k-32.cm2.aarch64.rpm
+openssl-libs-1.1.1k-32.cm2.aarch64.rpm
+openssl-perl-1.1.1k-32.cm2.aarch64.rpm
+openssl-static-1.1.1k-32.cm2.aarch64.rpm
 p11-kit-0.24.1-1.cm2.aarch64.rpm
 p11-kit-debuginfo-0.24.1-1.cm2.aarch64.rpm
 p11-kit-devel-0.24.1-1.cm2.aarch64.rpm
diff --git a/toolkit/resources/manifests/package/toolchain_x86_64.txt b/toolkit/resources/manifests/package/toolchain_x86_64.txt
index 803916c07aa..bd3714073d0 100644
--- a/toolkit/resources/manifests/package/toolchain_x86_64.txt
+++ b/toolkit/resources/manifests/package/toolchain_x86_64.txt
@@ -276,12 +276,12 @@ npth-1.6-4.cm2.x86_64.rpm
 npth-debuginfo-1.6-4.cm2.x86_64.rpm
 npth-devel-1.6-4.cm2.x86_64.rpm
 ntsysv-1.20-4.cm2.x86_64.rpm
-openssl-1.1.1k-31.cm2.x86_64.rpm
-openssl-debuginfo-1.1.1k-31.cm2.x86_64.rpm
-openssl-devel-1.1.1k-31.cm2.x86_64.rpm
-openssl-libs-1.1.1k-31.cm2.x86_64.rpm
-openssl-perl-1.1.1k-31.cm2.x86_64.rpm
-openssl-static-1.1.1k-31.cm2.x86_64.rpm
+openssl-1.1.1k-32.cm2.x86_64.rpm
+openssl-debuginfo-1.1.1k-32.cm2.x86_64.rpm
+openssl-devel-1.1.1k-32.cm2.x86_64.rpm
+openssl-libs-1.1.1k-32.cm2.x86_64.rpm
+openssl-perl-1.1.1k-32.cm2.x86_64.rpm
+openssl-static-1.1.1k-32.cm2.x86_64.rpm
 p11-kit-0.24.1-1.cm2.x86_64.rpm
 p11-kit-debuginfo-0.24.1-1.cm2.x86_64.rpm
 p11-kit-devel-0.24.1-1.cm2.x86_64.rpm

From b1c28864d01ec646ea42adc6ef656039bbcf18ed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Juan Camposeco <juanarturoc@microsoft.com>
Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2024 12:57:58 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 3/4] Fix typo

---
 SPECS/openssl/openssl.spec | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/SPECS/openssl/openssl.spec b/SPECS/openssl/openssl.spec
index 4ff1d7909a5..e0a76dcd1cd 100644
--- a/SPECS/openssl/openssl.spec
+++ b/SPECS/openssl/openssl.spec
@@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ rm -f %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/pki/tls/ct_log_list.cnf.dist
 * Tue Jun 04 2024 Tobias Brick <tobiasb@microsoft.com> - 1.1.1k-31
 - Only free the read buffers if we're not using them
 
-* Fri Apr 19 2024 Tobias Brick <tobaisb@microsoft.com> - 1.1.1k-30
+* Fri Apr 19 2024 Tobias Brick <tobiasb@microsoft.com> - 1.1.1k-30
 - Fix unconstrained session cache growth in TLSv1.3
 
 * Wed Feb 14 2024 Tobias Brick <tobiasb@microsoft.com> - 1.1.1k-29

From ff9330fcd106e7dee19f0a73cdb4e55c413af765 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Juan Camposeco <juanarturoc@microsoft.com>
Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2024 17:18:58 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 4/4] Restoring versioning coming from fasttrack branch

---
 SPECS/openssl/openssl.spec | 12 ++++++------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/SPECS/openssl/openssl.spec b/SPECS/openssl/openssl.spec
index e0a76dcd1cd..ea94f21f887 100644
--- a/SPECS/openssl/openssl.spec
+++ b/SPECS/openssl/openssl.spec
@@ -61,8 +61,8 @@ Patch37:        CVE-2023-3817.patch
 Patch38:        openssl-1.1.1-improve-safety-of-DH.patch
 Patch39:        openssl-1.1.1-add-null-checks-where-contentinfo-data-can-be-null.patch
 Patch40:        openssl-1.1.1-Fix-unconstrained-session-cache-growth-in-TLSv1.3.patch
-Patch41:        openssl-1.1.1-Only-free-the-read-buffers-if-we-re-not-using-them.patch
-Patch42:        openssl-1.1.1-pkcs1-implicit-rejection.patch
+Patch41:        openssl-1.1.1-pkcs1-implicit-rejection.patch
+Patch42:        openssl-1.1.1-Only-free-the-read-buffers-if-we-re-not-using-them.patch
 BuildRequires:  perl-Test-Warnings
 BuildRequires:  perl-Text-Template
 BuildRequires:  perl(FindBin)
@@ -367,12 +367,12 @@ rm -f %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/pki/tls/ct_log_list.cnf.dist
 %postun libs -p /sbin/ldconfig
 
 %changelog
-* Thu May 23 2024 Juan Camposeco <juan.camposeco@gmail.com> - 1.1.1k-32
- - Implicit rejection of PKCS#1 v1.5 (CVE-2023-50782) - cherrypick from fasttrack/2.0
-
-* Tue Jun 04 2024 Tobias Brick <tobiasb@microsoft.com> - 1.1.1k-31
+* Tue Jun 04 2024 Tobias Brick <tobiasb@microsoft.com> - 1.1.1k-32
 - Only free the read buffers if we're not using them
 
+* Thu May 23 2024 Juan Camposeco <juan.camposeco@gmail.com> - 1.1.1k-31
+- Implicit rejection of PKCS#1 v1.5 (CVE-2023-50782) - cherrypick from fasttrack/2.0
+
 * Fri Apr 19 2024 Tobias Brick <tobiasb@microsoft.com> - 1.1.1k-30
 - Fix unconstrained session cache growth in TLSv1.3
 
